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Disclosure is widely regarded as a necessary condition for market discipline in a modern 
financial sector. However, the determinants of disclosure decisions are still unknown, 
particularly among banks. This paper investigates the determinants of disclosure by Japanese 
Shinkin banks in 1996 and 1997. This period is unique because disclosure of non-performing 
loans was voluntary for Shinkin banks at this time. We find that banks with more serious bad 
loan problems, more leverage, less competitive pressure, and smaller banks were less likely to 
choose to voluntarily disclose. These results suggest that there may be a role for compulsory 
disclosure, as weak banks appear to disproportionately avoid voluntary disclosure.  
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Reserve Bank of San Francisco.   1. Introduction 
 
In the wake of worldwide financial deregulation and technological development in the 
financial sector, the task of bank supervision and regulation has become even more difficult. In 
this environment, the benefits of banks voluntarily disclosing their balance sheet positions can be 
even greater. Self-disclosure provides a channel for enhancing market discipline in the financial 
sector.  Market discipline is expected to play a growing role in bank regulation.  It is an 
important component of the new Basel Banking Committee framework for bank supervision, 
where it is considered one of the “three pillars” of bank regulation and supervision.
1  
There are a number of papers in the literature that identify empirical examples of market 
discipline. Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Morgan and Stiroh (2001), and Hancock and Kwast 
(2001) find a significant positive relationship between U.S. bank bond spreads and indicators of 
risk to the U.S. banking sector.  There are also proposals to require banks to issue subordinated 
debt to facilitate market discipline [e.g. Calomiris (1999)]. The motivation behind these 
proposals is that subordinated debt holders will have an incentive to monitor bank positions and 
spreads on subordinated debt will provide information of potential use to regulators as well as 
market participants.  Recent evidence indicates that private yields reflect information that differs 
from that possessed by regulators, suggesting that market discipline can enhance the regulatory 
environment [De Young, et al. (2001), Krainer and Lopez (2002)]. Moreover, the Federal 
Reserve Board considers market information such as stock prices and interest rate spreads in 
their bank supervision activities [Federal Reserve Study Group on Disclosure (2000)].  
Since firm disclosure enhances market discipline, regulatory authorities attempt to 
design regulations and accounting standards to enhance the level of disclosure. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
1 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999).  
 
  1there is a wide disparity in disclosure levels across nations. U.S. disclosure standards are 
considered high relative to the rest of the world, while disclosure rules in Japan are less stringent. 
It is not clear whether private firms would reveal the optimal amount of disclosure 
without government intervention.  Some argue that market forces encourage disclosure, so that 
depositors and creditors would require higher premia or deny funds to banks revealing less than 
the optimal level of disclosure. These market forces would then lead banks to optimal disclosure 
levels.  However, there are also reasons to believe that the level of disclosure chosen by banks on 
their own would fall below the optimal level.  As the government is usually a residual claimant 
on bank assets due to its role as a deposit insurer and a potential lender of last resort, the private 
sector has less than full incentive to monitor the disclosure levels of banks and to discipline 
banks for failing to disclose.  This would lead us to expect that banks would not voluntarily 
engage in full disclosure. 
Indeed, there appears to be evidence that they do not.  For example, Gunther and Moore 
(2000) investigate the impact of bank exams in the U.S. on the adequacy of the allowance for 
loan and lease losses.  They find that bank exams affect the accuracy of financial information 
released to the public.  In the absence of regulatory exams, banks underestimate the share of non-
performing loans in their balance sheet. 
It should be acknowledged that regulations inducing full disclosure would not 
necessarily be optimal.  Banks could respond to disclosure requirements in a number of 
dimensions, some of which would likely be unintended.  For example, a bank wishing to avoid 
releasing information to a potential rival may call in loans from a problem debtor rather than 
release information on them publicly.  Nevertheless, the general consensus is that the level of 
disclosure undertaken by Japanese banks is far below the social optimum, although the level of 
  2disclosure does appear to be improving over time.
2  For example, Balic, Bradley and Kiguchi 
(2002) conclude that Japanese “disclosure levels still fall short of the leaders in the Asia Pacific 
region and the U.S"
3.  Moreover, it is widely believed that the degree of disclosure is particularly 
sub-optimal among Japanese banks.  After the burst of the bubble economy, Japanese banks had 
large holdings of bad loans, but they did not disclose their holdings in a timely manner, even 
though market participants requested these figures.  
While required Japanese disclosure standards were minimal during the 1990s, some 
banks did respond to requests for disclosure by voluntarily revealing their asset positions. The 
characteristics of banks that chose to voluntarily disclose this information is of interest, both as 
an indicator of the incentives faced by Japanese banks and more broadly as an indicator of the 
factors that lead to voluntary bank disclosure.  The latter question is also relevant to bank 
regulation outside Japan, such as in the United States, where disclosure standards are so strict 
that there is usually little heterogeneity in disclosure levels across banks.  
In this paper, we examine this question by investigating the degree of disclosure among 
small Japanese credit associations known as Shinkin banks. In this paper, we examine the impact 
of Shinkin bank characteristics in 1998 on their decisions concerning bad loan disclosure in 1996 
and 1997.  Our sample is unique because disclosure of non-performing loans by Shinkin banks 
was voluntary in 1996 and 1997, but became compulsory in 1998.  Since individual bank 
conditions do not change very rapidly, bank conditions in 1998 give us a good indicator of 
conditions faced by banks in 1996  and 1997, including those banks that decided not to disclose 
their non-performing loans.  
                                                 
2 Singleton and Globerman (2002) find that voluntary disclosure by Japanese firms has increased 
significantly. 
 
3 Yamori and Baba (2001) survey the international literature on disclosure standards. 
 
  3Using this data, we examine a number of hypotheses concerning the determinants of 
disclosure decision.  Our first hypothesis is that larger Shinkin banks would be more likely to 
voluntarily disclose.  Larger Shinkin banks usually operate in more sophisticated financial 
environments with depositors that are more adamant about demanding balance sheet information.  
There may also be economies of scale in the calculation of financial information.  Finally, there 
are regulatory reasons for larger banks to disclose more readily; the National Association of 
Shinkin Banks (NASB) recommended, but did not require, disclosure by Shinkin banks with 
deposits exceeding 100 billion yen.  
Our second hypothesis is that Shinkin banks would be less likely to voluntarily disclose 
adverse information.  As we discuss below, the relative willingness to disclose adverse 
information is ambiguous in the literature.  Firms may wish to disclose good information to 
distinguish themselves from their competitors, but they may also feel a need to disclose bad 
information to avoid exposure to lawsuits.  In the case of banks, we believe that the presence of 
deposit insurance would seem to limit the pressure to voluntarily disclose adverse information, 
leading us to predict relatively less adverse information disclosure.   
Our third hypothesis concerns the impact of financial strength.  Traditionally, the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) executed the ‘convoy system’ regarding Japanese banks,
4 in which 
stronger banks were limited in their ability to compete against weaker banks. For example, 
deposit interest rates were limited to levels consistent with profitability by the most inefficient 
banks. However, by the time of our sample (March 1996 and 1997), the failures of many 
financial institutions suggest that the MOF had at least partially abandoned the convoy system.
5 
                                                 
4 See Spiegel (1999) for details of Japanese convoy system.  
 
5 Spiegel and Yamori (2003) find that the convoy system deteriorated over this period. 
 
  4Without the convoy system, a bank could benefit from distinguishing its financial situation from 
those of its rivals.  Our third hypothesis is therefore that institutions with lower leverage levels 
would be more likely to voluntarily disclose their balance sheet information. 
Our final hypothesis concerns market conditions. We would expect a bank that operated 
in a more competitive market to be more likely to pursue voluntary disclosure for a number of 
reasons: First, one would expect that a bank in a more competitive market would need to be more 
responsive to depositor demands for disclosure. Second, one would expect that in a less 
competitive market, banks would be less likely to voluntarily disclose information that was of 
potential use to rival banks.
6  Our final hypothesis is therefore that voluntary disclosure would be 
more prevalent in less concentrated markets.  
Our results demonstrate that banks with more serious bad loan problems are less likely 
to choose to voluntarily disclose.  Second, market forces, as measured by the intensity of local 
competition, did not measurably affect bank disclosure decisions in 1996, but did in 1997. 
Finally, we find that larger Shinkin banks were more likely to disclose information, in keeping 
with the corporate literature on disclosure.  These results are robust to the inclusion of variables 
representing regional differences, including past failures in the region and a complete set of 
regional dummies.  
This paper consists of six sections. Section 2 describes the Japanese Shinkin banks.  In 
section 3, we examine the history of bank disclosure in Japan.  Section 4 motivates the 
hypotheses we study in this paper and discusses our data sources.  Section 5 discusses our 
empirical results.  Finally, section 6 concludes.  
 
                                                 
6 Darrough and Stroughton (1990) provide a theoretical model of this impact of market concentration on 
voluntary disclosure by firms. 
 
  52. Japanese Shinkin Banks  
  Japan’s Shinkin banks, commonly known as credit associations, are relatively small 
financial institutions that are privately held by members living or operating near a bank’s 
headquarters.  They concentrate their lending on small and medium enterprises in a given region 
and can only issue up to 20 percent of their loans to non-members [Hsu (1999)].  However, they 
accept deposits from both members and the public.  In 1996, there were 410 Shinkin banks with 
average outstanding loans of 171 billion yen.  The average size of a Shinkin bank is therefore 
about an eighth that of a regional bank.  On average, they have 21 branches and 372 employees 
[Kano and Tsutsui (2003)]. 
  Despite the fact that they are small individually, the large number of Shinkin banks 
outstanding implies that as a group they form an important component of the overall Japanese 
financial system (see Table 1).  As a group, Shinkin banks have more deposits and loans 
outstanding than either the group of Second Regional or Trust banks.  Moreover, because 
Japanese Shinkin banks are mandated to provide a large share of the financing of small and 
medium firms who might have exceptional difficulty obtaining credit elsewhere [Fukuyama 
(1996)], their importance to the financial system may exceed their size. 
  There may be some concern that since Shinkin banks are privately held and only issue 
loans to their members, they may deviate from decisions based on profit maximization.  
However, despite the fact that members elect the CEO of Shinkin banks, they have a lot of 
autonomy in practice.  Moreover, while general evidence on Shinkin banks’ deposit sources is 
unavailable, evidence from individual Shinkin banks that do release their deposit share data 
indicates that a majority of deposits are obtained from the general public, rather than members.
7  
                                                 
7 For example, Toyohashi Shinkin, the 60th largest shinkin bank, recently disclosed that only 
  6As such, although we admit that Shinkin banks may have unique characteristics because of their 
status as mutual organizations, we feel comfortable proceeding under the assumption that 
Shinkin banks do behave in a similar manner to commercial banks and face market discipline 
from their depositors. 
 
3. Disclosure by Japanese financial institutions 
  In the 1980s, Japanese banks outperformed U.S. and European banks.  However, the 
downturn in the 1990s deteriorated the financial positions of Japanese banks.  Moreover, when 
defaults did occur, collateral values (primarily backed by land and real estate) were not large 
enough to cover losses.  This led to the current bad loan problems faced by Japanese financial 
institutions.  
  Japanese banks were initially very reluctant to disclose their bad loan exposure, and 
disclosure was initially not required by the MOF.  However, the public demand for bad loan 
disclosures grew as the situation deteriorated.  This led to large banks (city banks, long-term 
credit banks, and trust banks) being forced to disclose the magnitude of ‘loans to failed 
borrowers,’ which we label BAD1, and ‘loans to borrowers who can not pay within six months of 
due date,’ which we label BAD2, at the end of March 1993. First and second regional banks, 
which are on average smaller than large banks, were also forced to disclose BAD1, but they were 
not required to disclose BAD2. 
  Banks sometimes engaged in “evergreening” of loans, i.e. renegotiating loan interest rates 
and due dates in order to avoid default.  This practice left disclosure of BAD1 and BAD2 poor 
indicators of a bank’s true financial condition. In response, large banks have also been required 
                                                                                                                                                             
29.2 percent of its deposits came from its members, while the remainder came from the general 
public. 
  7to disclose the magnitude of ‘loans with interest rates lower than Bank of Japan’s discount rates,’ 
which we label BAD3, since September1995.   
  Regional banks were also obligated to begin disclosing BAD2 and BAD3 in March 1996. 
At that time, large banks also began disclosing ‘the amounts of loans to borrowers whom banks 
supported,’ which we label BAD4.  
  Regulation forcing smaller regional financial institutions to disclose was slower in 
coming.  Initially, the MOF encouraged, but did not force smaller financial institutions, such as 
Shinkin banks and Credit Unions, to disclose these figures.  After the failure of several small 
financial institutions, however, the public demanded the disclosure of information concerning 
these small institutions’ financial condition as well.  
The MOF began releasing figures for problem loans of smaller institutions in September 
1995.  However, it initially only disclosed aggregate figures.  The MOF defended its disclosure 
policy on the basis of concerns that adverse news about individual small banks might trigger 
runs.  However, this policy was strongly criticized after many banks that reported adequate 
capital positions eventually failed.  This led to a growing consensus that transparency in the 
Japanese financial sector would facilitate the revitalization of the sector.  
Because of this external pressure, the National Association of Shinkin Banks (NASB) 
recommended that the Shinkin banks holding deposits equal to or larger than 100 billion yen 
disclose their BAD1 positions at the end of March 1996 and that all Shinkin banks disclose their 
BAD1 positions at the end of March 1997.  However, as we demonstrate below, some Shinkin 
that fell within this criterion did not disclose their bad loan figures at the end of March 1996. 
Indeed, a few did not even disclose their bad loan figures by the end of March 1997.  In March of 
1998, the NASB directed all Shinkin banks to disclose their BAD1, BAD2, BAD3, and BAD4 
  8positions.  It follows that the disclosure of balance sheet positions was “voluntary” for Shinkin 
banks only in 1996 and 1997 (see Table 2).    
  Because of the limited disclosure discretion faced by banks in the United States, evidence 
on voluntary bank disclosure among U.S. banks is limited.  However, there is a large literature 
on voluntary disclosure across U.S. corporations.  Skinner (1994, 1997) posits that managers 
choose voluntary disclosure to limit exposure to stockholder litigation.  Skinner (1994) finds that 
managers voluntarily disclose adverse earnings news “early,” or before the mandated release 
date.  Skinner (1997) also finds that early voluntary disclosure lowers expected legal costs. These 
results suggest that managers voluntarily disclose bad news more than good news. 
  Other research investigates whether voluntary disclosure reduces the cost of capital, as 
enhanced disclosure reduces information asymmetries.  Botosan (1997) finds that greater 
disclosure is associated with a lower cost of equity capital for firms with low analyst followings.  
Information asymmetries would be greatest among these firms.  Lang and Lundholm (2000) find 
that firms increase their disclosure activity prior to an equity offering announcement.
8 These 
results suggest that firms disclose favorable information to distinguish themselves from less 
successful firms. 
Concerning the disclosure decisions of Japanese corporations, Cooke [(1991), (1992), 
(1996)] uses annual reports of Japanese corporations to measure the degree of voluntary 
disclosure.  Cooke finds that size is the most important determinant of voluntary disclosure by 
Japanese firms.  Singleton and Globerman (2002) also find that larger Japanese corporations tend 
to disclose more information.   
                                                 
8 Lang and Lundholm also find that firms that substantially increase their disclosure activity before the 
offering suffer much larger price declines at the announcement of their intent to issue equity. They 
interpret this fact as suggesting these firms use voluntary disclosure to “hype the stock.”  
 
  9In addition to size, Cooke finds that firm voluntary disclosure decisions are affected by 
their equity listing characteristics, including whether and where a firm is listed (domestically or 
internationally).  He also finds that the degree of voluntary disclosure is affected by industry 
type, distinguishing between manufacturing and other industries, and by leverage. 
Cooke (1996) examines the effect of Keiretsu membership on corporate disclosure.  
Within the Keiretsu, information may be more widely shared.  As a result, a firm in a Keiretsu 
may face less severe information asymmetry difficulties, as it primarily obtains its financing 
from its Keiretsu main bank partner.  This would give firms within a Keiretsu less motivation to 
voluntarily disclose.  However, after controlling for size, stock market listing status, leverage, 
and industry type, Cooke finds no evidence supporting the hypothesis that Keiretsu firms 
disclose less information than other firms.  
  
4. Hypotheses Concerning Disclosure levels 
In this section, we elaborate on the hypotheses we test in our study.  As our sample 
consists of only Shinkin banks, there is no issue of listing status or industry type.  Shinkin banks 
are all unlisted closed membership cooperatives.
9  Also, due to regulatory constraints, the basic 
activity of Shinkin banks are all identical.  That is, they collect deposits from their member firms 
and local depositors and lend primarily to member firms.  
 
 
                                                 
9 Because Shinkin banks are unlisted, a number of the potential considerations for voluntary disclosure 
raised in the literature may not be relevant.  For example, Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that disclosure 
may reduce transactions costs in capital markets by lowering information asymmetries, affect corporate 
control contests, circumvent inside trade regulation when managers exercise stock options, or signal 
management talent.  Some of these considerations may be irrelevant for unlisted Shinkin banks, while 
others may manifest themselves in different ways than they would under listed firms.   
 
 104.1 Size  
We expect size to have a positive effect on a firm’s disclosure activity for a number of 
reasons: First, larger firms need to raise capital in the market more frequently and are under 
greater pressure from shareholders and market analysts for increased disclosure.  While Shinkin 
banks raise little capital in the market, larger Shinkin banks may face greater disclosure pressure 
from their depositors because they usually operate in more financially-sophisticated 
environments than smaller Shinkin banks.  Customers (both depositors and borrowers) of larger 
Shinkin banks are more often approached by commercial bank competitors, such as city banks 
and regional banks.  In contrast, small Shinkin banks usually enjoy relatively isolated long-term 
relationships with their member firms, and are not as exposed to market pressures.  For example, 
the largest Shinkin bank in Japan, Jonan Shinkin bank, is located in Tokyo, the second largest 
Shinkin bank, Okazaki Shinkin bank, is located in Aichi, and the third largest Shinkin bank, 
Kyoto-Chuo Shinkin banks, is located in Kyoto.  These are all major urban areas with 
sophisticated financial environments. 
It has also been suggested that voluntary disclosure would be positively related to bank 
size due to economies of scale in the calculation of financial information.  For example, 
Kyobashi Shinkin bank employed only 23 managers and workers as of March 1998.  However, 
we doubt that this argument would apply to Shinkin banks for two reasons.  First, the bad loan 
amount figures we consider should be relatively easy for banks to calculate.  Moreover, as the 
MOF has reported aggregate bad loan figures for Shinkin banks since 1995, they must have 
received the disaggregated number from all of the Shinkin banks, including the smaller ones.
10  
  Finally, there may be regulatory reasons for larger banks to be more likely to voluntarily 
                                                 
10 Chen et al. (2002) argue that disclosure costs are unimportant determinants of voluntary balance sheet disclosure 
decisions. 
 
 11disclose.  The National Association of Shinkin Banks recommended, but did not require, 
disclosure by Shinkin banks with deposits exceeding 100 billion yen. Therefore, larger Shinkin 
banks were under more pressure from the NASB.  On the other hand, bank regulation may 
induce a negative relationship between size and disclosure if larger Shinkin banks are considered 
too-big-to-fail.  However, we doubt this possibility as several banks that were larger than the 
largest Shinkin banks had failed by the time of our sample [Spiegel and Yamori (2003)].  
 
4.2 Leverage  
  Leverage has also been identified as an important determinant of voluntary disclosure. 
Firms with higher leverage ratios will incur higher monitoring costs, which can be reduced 
through disclosure [e.g. Cooke (1996)].  In addition, leverage levels affect depositors’ 
interpretation of the severity of bad loan difficulties.  Disclosure of bad loan levels may be 
positive news if they indicate that management intends to address a bank’s bad loan problem. 
This would of course depend on a bank’s capacity to address its difficulties, which would be 
greater at less leveraged banks, holding all else equal.  This may leave managers of less 
leveraged banks more willing to disclose information on bad loans.  
 
4.3 Adverse News 
  Whether disclosure revealed good or bad news concerning the bank’s underlying 
financial position is obviously also relevant.  As discussed above, however, the literature is 
mixed as to whether firms would be more willing to disclose good or bad information.
  Skinner (1994), among others, argued that managers had greater incentives to disclose 
adverse news due to the expected legal costs from failing to reveal such news, and to the 
 12potential enhancement of reputations from bad news disclosure.  Darrough and Stroughton 
(1990) argue that managers are more likely to disclose bad news for entry deterrence reasons.  
Teoh and Hwang (1991) argue that the disclosure of adverse news reveals that a firm can handle 
the release of such news, and therefore serves as a positive signal of firm quality.  
  On the other hand, many studies predict that managers would be more willing to disclose 
good news in order to distinguish their firms from their competitors.  For example, Lev and 
Panman (1990), documented that managers disclose good news forecasts more often than bad 
news forecasts. Scott (1994), examines Canadian firms’ voluntary disclosure of defined benefit 
pension plan information and also finds that good news is more likely to be disclosed.  
Verrecchia (1983) finds that more favorable news is more likely to be disclosed, after controlling 
for disclosure costs.  
Usually, one would have difficulty calculating the impact of news quality on the 
disclosure decision, as conditions faced by banks deciding not to disclose would be 
unobservable.  However, in the case of our sample, all Shinkin banks have faced compulsory 
disclosure in March 1998. Although there will be some disparities, we believe that the disclosure 
figures in March 1998 are good predictors of conditions that were not disclosed in 1996 and 
1997. 
We test this conjecture by looking at the correlation among banks that did choose to 
disclose during the voluntary periods with their figures in 1998.  The correlation coefficient 
between BAD1 in March 1996 and that in March 1998 is 0.88 for Shinkin banks that disclosed 
both figures and the correlation coefficient between BAD1 in March 1997 and March 1998 is 
0.94. These high correlation coefficients would appear to confirm our conjecture. 
 
 134.4 Market Structure 
Shinkin Banks generally operate within a prefecture or smaller region where their 
headquarters are located.  Although these banks specialize in small-size business lending, they 
do face competition from the rest of the banking industry within their area.  It is well known that 
the level of this competition varies greatly across the nation [Kano and Tsutui (2003)].  
We would expect a bank that operated in a more competitive market to be more likely to 
pursue voluntary disclosure for a number of reasons:  First, a bank in a more competitive market 
would be likely to need to be more responsive to depositor demands for disclosure.  Second, one 
would expect that in a less competitive market, banks would be less likely to voluntarily disclose 




  Our dependent variable is binary, representing the discrete disclosure decision of a 
Shinkin bank concerning the relevant bad loan measure. Our data source is Financial Statements 
of Shinkin Banks (FSSB) which is published annually by the Kinyu Tosyo Consultant Sha. As 
this is the only available data source regarding Shinkin banks, if the relevant figures are not 
reported here, then we assume that the figures were not disclosed.
12  
                                                 
11 Chen et al. (2002) finds that investors demand greater disclosure when reported losses are higher. In 
response, managers disclose more when reported losses are large. However, as profits also increase a 
bank’s ability to write off its bad loans, its net impact on willingness to disclose is ambiguous. 
To examine the impact of profitability, we added the natural log of business profits (Gyomu-rieki) as of 
March 1998 in our first stage estimation as a proxy for expected future performance.  The variable was 
insignificant. The results with profits included are available from the authors upon request. 
 
12 A footnote in the FSSB notes that 18 Shinkin banks claimed that their figures were not available at the 
FSSB’s publication deadline for the March-1996 version, but that they would be disclosed later. However, 
this claim appears to be dubious, as the publication deadline occurred after the June members’ meeting, 
for which financial statements would have to calculated and approved by auditors.  We therefore treat 
these 18 banks as failing to disclose.  Information is unavailable as to whether or not they did eventually 
disclose their positions that year.  We checked the robustness of our results below by re-running our 
 14  The level of Shinkin bank disclosure in our sample is summarized in Table 3.  There 
were 416 Shinkin Banks at the end of March 1996, and 407 at the end of March 1997.  At the 
end of March 1996, 305 of the 416 Shinkin banks disclosed BAD1.  No banks disclosed BAD2 or 
BAD3.  We use a qualitative variable, DISC96 as our dependent variable for the March 1996 
sample.  DISC96 takes unit value if the Shinkin bank disclosed BAD1 in March 1996 and zero 
value otherwise.  
  For March 1997, only 33 Shinkin banks, or 8 percent of the industry, pursued no 
voluntary disclosure. 139 out of the 407 Shinkin Banks disclosed BAD1, BAD2, and BAD3. 
While this represents an increase in disclosure levels, it still falls below the rest of the financial 
sector.  Large banks had all disclosed BAD1, BAD2, and BAD3 since September 1995, while 
regional banks had disclosed BAD1, BAD2, and BAD3 since March 1996.  For our March 1997 
sample, we use an ordered-dummy variable, DISC97, to indicate disclosure intensity.  DISC97 
takes value zero if a Shinkin bank did not disclose BAD1, takes value one if it disclosed only 
BAD1, and takes value two if it disclosed both BAD1 and BAD2.  Similarly, it takes value three if 
it disclosed BAD1, BAD2, and BAD3.
13   
Table 3 also displays the geographic distribution of Shinkin disclosure. It can be seen 
that the magnitude of disclosure by Shinkin banks is asymmetric by region.  For example, 94% 
of Shinkin banks in Kanto (excluding Tokyo) disclosed BAD1 at the end of March 1996, while 
only 46% of Shinkin banks in Tohoku disclosed BAD1 in that year.  This suggests that regional 
factors also affect the disclosure decision of Shinkin banks.  We control for regional disparities 
in our robustness checks below. 
                                                                                                                                                             
specification with these 18 Shinkin banks excluded from our sample.  
 
13 Scott (1994) uses a similar ordered-dummy variable method to indicate disclosure levels. In his study, 
firms can disclose both pension costs and interest assumptions, only pension costs, or neither.   
 15Concerning the independent variables, we use assets as of March 1998 as a proxy for 
size (LASSET). We use the capital ratio as of March 1998 as a proxy of bank leverage 
(CAPRATIO). We use two measures of the severity of bad loan news contained in the disclosure. 
HATANRATIO is defined as the ratio of BAD1 to total loans on March 1998. FURYORATIO is 
defined that the ratio of BAD2 and BAD3 to total loans on March 1998
14. 
We also use two measures of market competitiveness. LGDPBRANCH96 is defined as 
the log of Gross Prefectural Product (for fiscal year 1995, ending at March 1996) divided by total 
bank branches and Shinkin banks in March 1996.  LGDPBRANCH97 is defined in the same 
manner and is used for the 1997 disclosure decision estimation.  A low value of LGDPBRANCH 
would imply greater competition in that prefecture.  The coefficient on LGDPBRANCH is 
therefore expected to be negative, as competition would induce more disclosure.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Results for Failed Banks 
  Before formally investigating the determinants of Shinkin bank disclosure, we first check 
the disclosure patterns of the subset of Shinkin banks that failed after the end of March 1997. 
There was one Shinkin bank failure in 1999, seven in 2000, six in 2001, and 13 in 2002. 
Disclosure decisions for these failed banks are compared to the rest of the sample in Table 4.  
The 27 failed Shinkin banks chose disclosure less frequently than the rest of the sample.  Only 50 
percent of Shinkin banks that failed between 1998 and 2001 disclosed BAD1 in March 1996, 
while 75 percent of the surviving Shinkin banks reported BAD1 in that year.  
                                                 
14 We do not anticipate any causality problems with these variables. Bank bad loan problems had been 
growing since the late 1980s, while Shinkin banks were not required to disclose their bad loan amounts 
before the mid-1990s. See Core (2001) for further discussion. 
 
 16It is also interesting to compare Shinkin banks that failed during 1998 to 2001 with 
those that failed in 2002.  The former group, for whom failure was apparently more imminent in 
March 1997, was more reluctant to disclose bad loan information than the latter group.  This 
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that banks with solvency problems and adverse news 
disclosed less and that the magnitude of their difficulties affected their disclosure decision. 
 
5.2 Disclosure Decisions in March 1996 
  As banks that did disclose in 1996 only disclosed BAD1, our dependent variable is 
binary.  We therefore report the results of both OLS and PROBIT estimation for disclosure 
decisions in that year.  Missing data reduced our sample size from 416 banks to 387 banks.
15 
  Our results for 1996 are shown in Table 5.  The results for both OLS and probit 
estimation are essentially the same.  First, our size variable, LASSET, is positive and significant 
as predicted and consistent with earlier studies.  
Recall that the NASB recommended in this year that Shinkin banks holding larger than 
100 billion yen deposits disclose their values of BAD1.  To investigate whether this was a factor 
in the more frequent disclosure by larger Shinkin banks, we split the sample into two sub-
samples based on whether deposit amounts in March 1998 were larger or smaller than 100 
billion yen.  Out of the 245 Shinkin banks exceeding this deposit level in 1998, only 14 did not 
disclose their values of BAD1 in March 1996. In contrast, out of the 142 Shinkin banks with less 
than 100 billion yen in assets, 65 did not disclose BAD1.  Therefore, we would conclude that the 
NASB’s recommendation was a factor in the greater amount of disclosure among larger Shinkin 
banks.  
                                                 
15 Financial statements as of March 1998 for 29 Shinkin banks were not available because of mergers or 
failures.  
 
 17The estimated coefficient on our leverage measure, CAPRATIO, is positive but 
insignificant, implying that leverage was not a very important factor in 1996 disclosure choices.   
Turning to our bad loan measures, the estimated coefficient for HATANRATIO is 
significantly negative at the 5 percent level for both specifications.  This suggests that Shinkin 
banks that held more bad loans were less likely to disclose BAD1 in March 1996.  This implies 
that Shinkin banks were more likely to withhold bad information.   
The estimated coefficient for LGDPBRANCH96 is not significant and is unexpectedly 
positive.  This suggests that disparities in market competition did not influence disclosure 
decisions in 1996. 
 
5.3 Disclosure Decisions in March 1997  
As DISC97 is also a qualitative dependent variable, we again report the results of both 
OLS and ordered probit estimation.  Our specification now also includes the FURYORATIO 
variable.  As shown in Table 3, most Shinkin banks disclosed BAD1 for March 1997.  Therefore, 
HATANRATIO was disclosed for most Shinkin banks, while FURYORATIO was still undisclosed 
for most banks.  
The results are shown in Table 5.  The coefficient for LASSET is positive for both the 
OLS and ordered probit estimations. These results suggest that size was still an important 
determinant of Shinkin banks’ disclosure decisions in 1997.  
The coefficient on our leverage variable, CAPRATIO, is now significant.  This is quite 
distinct from our 1996 results and appears to be attributable to the decline in Japanese financial 
conditions between 1996 and 1997. With this decline in financial conditions, the value to sound 
banks of distinguishing themselves from the rest of the industry was increased.  
 18Both HATANRATIO and FURYORATIO take their expected negative coefficients, as 
adverse news is less likely to be disclosed.  However, the HATANRATIO coefficient is 
insignificant in both models, while the coefficient for FURYORATIO is highly significant in both 
models.  This disparity appears to be attributable to the fact that by 1997 there was little 
variability across Shinkin banks in the disclosure of BAD1, as almost all banks disclosed this 
figure.    
  The coefficient for LGDPBRANCH97 is now significantly negative at around 5 percent. 
This suggests that competition promotes bank disclosures, as predicted. 
  To check our robustness, we considered an alternative indicator of disclosure in 1997. 
We specify our dependent variable as a binary variable that takes value zero if there was no 
disclosure or if only BAD1 was disclosed, and value one otherwise.  Under this specification, 238 
Shinkin banks in the sample are given value zero, and 144 Shinkin banks are given value 1.  The 
results are shown in Table 5.  The size variable, LASSET, is now insignificant, but the remaining 
results are all the same.  The coefficients on CAPRATIO, FURYORATIO, and LGDPBRANCH97 
all enter significantly with their predicted signs.  We therefore conclude that our results are fairly 
robust to using a binary dependent variable for the 1997 sample.  
 
5.4 Regional differences 
  Kano and Tsutsui (2003) find that Shinkin bank markets are segmented by region.  There 
are also a number of reasons to expect that Shinkin bank disclosure decisions may differ across 
regions.  Shinkin banks in regions in which failures took place may find themselves under 
greater pressure from depositors to disclose.  There are also regional disparities in economic 
 19conditions.
16  As such, one would want to condition on regional differences to evaluate the 
robustness of the results above.   
  We first examine the impact of regional failure histories.  Prior to March 1997, there 
were only two Shinkin failures; Toyo Shinkin in Osaka in 1992 and Kamaishi Shinkin in Iwate 
in 1993.  However, local commercial bank failures may also have affected the disclosure 
pressure faced by Shinkin banks.  There were four such bank failures before March 1997; Toho 
Sogo Bank in Ehime in 1992, Hyogo Bank in Hyogo in 1995, Taiheyo Bank in Tokyo in 1996, 
and Hanwa Bank in Wakayama in 1996.  To accommodate regional differences that may have 
existed due to these failures, we introduce a Regional Failure indicator into our specification.  
This indicator takes value one if a Shinkin bank is located in one of the prefectures with failure 
histories mentioned above (i.e. if the bank is from Ehime, Hyogo, Tokyo, and Wakayama), and 
zero otherwise.  
  The results are shown in Table 6.  The Regional Failure indicator is universally 
insignificant and therefore leaves the original results largely intact.  In particular, we retain the 
results that larger banks are more likely to disclose, as are banks in stronger financial positions.  
The most notable difference in our results is that the intensity of local competition no longer 
enters significantly, although it still takes on the appropriate negative sign.
17 
                                                 
16 There may also be regional disparities in regulatory treatment.  While Shinkin banks from all regions 
were formally subject ot the same regulatory restrictions, local regulator discretion may have resulted in 
heterogeneity in the enforcement of these restrictions. 
 
17 It may be the case that smaller failures did not have as significant impact on their regions.  To 
investigate this possibility, we also limited our Regional Failure dummy to those regions that had failures 
whose resolution costs to the Deposit Insurance Corporation exceeded 100 billion yen.  These included 
Tokyo (Cosmo Credit Union, Taiheyo), Hyogo (Hyogo Bank), and Osaka (Kizu Credit Union).  Our 
results with this alternative indicator were essentially the same and are available from the authors on 
request. 
 20  Finally, regional disparities may arise for a number of reasons, not limited to local failure 
histories.  To more broadly entertain fixed regional disparities, we also ran our specification with 
separate dummies for all regions.  We construct 8 regional dummies; (1) HOKATOHO, which 
includes Hokkaido and Tohoku, (2) KANTO, which includes Tokyo, (3) HOKURIKU, 
(4)CHUBU, which includes Aichi, (5) KINKI, which includes Osaka and Hyogo, (6) 
CHUGOKU, (7) SHIKOKU, and (8) KYUSHU.  The results are shown in Table 7.  Again, our 





Disclosure is widely regarded as a necessary condition for market discipline in a 
modern financial sector. However, the determinants of disclosure decisions are still unknown, 
particularly among banks.  To formulate optimal disclosure policy, it is necessary to know what 
factors affect disclosure decision of banks.  In this paper, we investigate the determinants of 
Shinkin banks’ bad loan disclosure for March 1996 and 1997.  This period is unique because 
disclosure was voluntary for Shinkin banks during this time.  
We obtain several interesting results. First, banks with more serious bad loan problems 
were less likely to choose to voluntarily disclose.  Second, larger Shinkin banks were more likely 
disclose information, consistent with the corporate literature on disclosure.  Finally, market 
forces, as measured by the intensity of local competition, did not force banks to disclose more 
information in March 1996, but did in March 1997.  This final result, however, was not robust to 
the inclusion of regional dummy indicators, leaving it difficult to conclude whether the observed 
                                                 
18 For space considerations, the dummy coefficients were not reported. These are available from the 
authors upon request.  To avoid multicollinearity, we dropped the KANTO dummy.  As such, the constant 
coefficient should be interpreted as representing the KANTO region. 
 21regional differences were truly attributable to differences in local competition conditions, or to 
other factors, such as disparities in local failure experiences.  
  There are several questions for future investigation.  First, in this paper, we only 
investigated the decision to disclose bad loan ratios.  Some analysts contend that bad loan 
disclosure is insufficient to evaluate banks’ financial conditions.  It is therefore important to 
examine the determinants of disclosure of other types of bank information.  Second, the 
credibility of the disclosed information is also uncertain.
19  As Hutchison (1997) pointed out, the 
MOF several times changed financial disclosure and accounting rules to allow stock losses to be 
deferred and to delay the effect of real estate price declines on banks’ reported capital.  The 
quality of disclosed information could affect bank decisions as to whether or not to disclose.  
Third, our study demonstrates that weak banks are less likely to voluntarily disclose.  There may 
therefore be a role for compulsory disclosure, as such a requirement may disproportionately fall 
on weaker banks.  It would be interesting to evaluate the impact of such disclosure requirements 
on bank behavior.  
  Finally, the impact of disclosure on bank systematic risk is also of interest.  Banks’ assets 
are opaque, in the sense that it is hard for outsiders to evaluate bank loan quality due to 
information asymmetry.  Furthermore, banks rely heavily on short-term liabilities.  Disclosure by 
individual banks may trigger market-wide actions by private stakeholders, leading to systemic 
risk [Federal Reserve System Study Group on Disclosure (2000)].
20  Regarding U.S. banks, 
                                                 
19 Although only limited information is available, there is some evidence that Japanese markets did 
discipline riskier banks (e.g., Genay 1999, Yamori 1999, Bremer and Pettway 2002). Therefore, 
disclosure may enhance market discipline.  
 
20 For example, Cordella and Yeyati (1998) construct a theoretical model to study the effect of disclosure 
on the probability of banking crises. They find that when banks do not control their risk exposure, 
disclosure may increase the probability of bank failures. 
 
 22Jordan et al. (2000) found that disclosure was not destabilizing.  It would be interesting to 
examine if this was also the case for Japan. 
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 26Table 1.  Japanese Financial Institutions, March 1996 
































410 97,732 70,201 
 












 27Table 2.  “Bad-loan” Disclosure Requirements Among Japanese Financial Institutions
a 









Large Banks  March 1993  March 1993  March 1996
b  September 1996
c 
(City, long-term 
credit, and trust 
banks) 
 
    
Regional Banks  March 1993  March 1996  March 1997
d  March 1997 
      
Second Regional 
Banks 
March 1993  March 1997
d  March 1997
d  March 1997 











a. This table is based on financial statement disclosure requirements. The total amount of bad loan that the entire 
deposit-taking financial institutions held has been disclosed since September 1995. 
 
b. Voluntary disclosure has existed since September 1995. However, the figures were not included in the official 
financial statements for that year. 
 
c. The figures have been voluntarily disclosed in annual report since March 1996. 
 
d. The disclosure for March 1996 was voluntary and became required after March 1997. However, all banks actually 
voluntarily disclosed their figures in March 1996. 
 
e. The National Association of Shinkin Banks recommended disclosure by Shinkin banks with deposits exceeding 
















Table 3.  The Disclosure Levels of Shinkin Banks by Region 





























Hokkaido 13  19 32    1 19  0  12  32 





3 47  50    1  39  1  9  50 
Tokyo 12  39  51    7  38  1  1  49 
Koushinetsu 3  17  20    1  10  0  9  20 
Hokuriku 8  17  25    1 4  0  20 25 
Tokai 1  46  47    1  20  0  26  47 
Kinki 9  44  53    6  32  0  15  53 
Chugoku 18  20  38    2  25  0  7  36 
Shikoku 2 12  14    1  3 0  10  14 
Kyushu 21  26  47    2  25  0  18  46 






Notes:   Indicators of disclosure levels are defined as follows: Nothing: No disclosure regarding any kinds of bad 
loans.  BAD1: Only loans to failed companies are disclosed.  BAD1+2: Loans to failed companies and loans six 
month overdue are disclosed.  BAD1+2+3: In addition to above two loans, loans whose interest rates are lower than 
































      
Number 
 
     
Not Failed 
 
389  291   371  345 131 126 
Failed in 1999, 
2000, and 2001 
 
14  7   14 10  2 2 
Failed  in  2002  13  8   13 10  2 1 
      
Ratio 
 
     
Not Failed 
 
389  75%    371  93% 35% 34% 
Failed in 1999, 
2000, and 2001 
 
14  50%    14  71% 14% 14% 
Failed in 2002 
 






Notes: Indicators of disclosure levels are defined as follows: Nothing: No disclosure regarding any kinds of bad 
loans.  BAD1: Only loans to failed companies are disclosed.  BAD1+2: Loans to failed companies and loans six 
month overdue are disclosed.  BAD1+2+3: In addition to above two loans, loans whose interest rates are lower than 
Bank of Japan’s discount rates are disclosed.  Failure dates are based decision by Deposit Insurance Corporation to 









Table 5. Estimation Results for Disclosure Choices 
 




























































































        








# of observations  387 
 




0.246     0.121    0.139   
Log likelihood  -160.603 -150.215    -527.081  -329.22  -234.28  -215.097 
LR Index (Pseudo 
R-squared) 
 




 0.288          0.149 
%correct   80          67 
 
 
Notes: See text for definitions of qualitative dependent variables.  Figures in the parentheses are standard errors.   
** Statistically significant at 5% confidence level.  * Statistically significant at 10% confidence level. 
 31Table 6. Estimation Results for Disclosure Choices with Regional Failure Dummy 
 




























































































        
























# of observations  387 
 




0.247     0.124    0.140   
Log likelihood  -159.763 -149.762    -525.92  -327.974  -233.526  -214.825 
LR Index (Pseudo 
R-squared) 
 




 0.290          0.151 
%correct   80          67 
 
 
Notes: See text for definitions of qualitative dependent variables.  Figures in the parentheses are standard errors.   
** Statistically significant at 5% confidence level.  * Statistically significant at 10% confidence level. 
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Table 7. Estimation Results for Disclosure Choices with Regional Dummies 
 




























































































        









# of observations  387 
 




0.275     0.162    0.177   
Log likelihood  -149.264 -137.44    -514.203  -317.827 -221.891 -205.923 
LR Index (Pseudo 
R-squared) 
 




 0.349          0.186 
%correct   83          72 
 
 
Notes: See text for definitions of qualitative dependent variables.  Figures in the parentheses are standard errors.  
Specifications included regional dummies, which were not listed for space considerations.  The estimations and 
standard errors of the dummy variables are available upon request.  ** Statistically significant at 5% confidence 
level.  * Statistically significant at 10% confidence level. 
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